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Hing: Immigration Law

IMMIGRATION LAW
DEFENSES AND RELIEF FROM DEPORTATION-RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE NINTH CIRCUIT
Bill Ong Hing*
INTRODUCTION

A review of the Federal Reporter for the 1979-1980 term
reveals that the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has been
the busiest federal court of appeals in the immigration and deportation area. 1 This is a direct reflection of the high apprehension and deportation statistics in the western states for the
Immigration and Naturalization Service.2 The immigration decisions of the Ninth Circuit therefore directly affect large number
of aliens and have great national significance. The discussion
which follows surveys several key areas in which the Ninth Circuit has had significant impact in the past year on the development of defenses and relief from deportation.
I. SUSPENSION OF DEPORTATION

Under section 244(a) of the Immigration and Nationality
Act (the Act), the "Attorney General may, in his discretion, suspend deportation and adjust the status" of a deportable a1jen to
that of a lawful permanent resident if certain statutory conditions are satisfied.S In general, there are three eligibility require* Assistant Professor of Law, Golden Gate University; J.D., University of San Francisco, 1974; LL.M. (candidate) University of California, Berkeley (Boalt Hall); Former
Director, Immigration Law Unit, San Francisco Neighborhood Legal Assistance Foundation; Staff Advisory Group, Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy.
1. See e.g., 604-628 F.2d (1979-1980).
2. See 1977 I.N.S. ANN. REP. 89.
3. Section 244(a) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a) (1976), provides:
As hereinafter prescribed in this section, the Attorney
General may, in his discretion, suspend deportation and adjust
the status to that of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent
residence, in the case of an alien who applies to the Attorney
General for suspension of deportation and(1) is deportable under any law of the United States ex285
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ments: continuous physical presence, good moral character, and
a showing of hardship.· During the past year, tlie Ninth Circuit
has decided several important cases pertaining to the continuous
physical presence and hardship requirements.
A. Continuous Physical Presence
Depending on \Yhat ground for deportation applies, an alien
applying for suspension of deportation relief must have been
"physically present in the United States for a continuous period of not less than" seven or ten years.& However, in Chan. v.
Immigration & Naturalization Service,s the Ninth Circuit held
that even though the aliens had made several departures of up
to ninety-five days during the seven-year period, the continuous
physical presence requirement had been satisfied, and in de Gallardo v. Immigration and Naturalization Service,7 the same
court found that a vacation of three and one-half months did
not necessarily break the co~tinuity requirement.
At first glance, tho Chan and de Gallardo holdings appear
cept the provisions specified in paragraph (2) of this subsection; has been physically present in the United States for a
continuous period of not less than seven years immediately
preceding the data of such application, and proves that during
all of such period he was and is a person of good moral character; and is a person who deportation would, in the opinion of
the Attorney Gen1lral, result in extreme hardship to the alien
or to his spouse, parent, or child, who is a citizen of the United
States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence;
or
(2) is deportable under paragraphs (4), (5), (6), (7), (11),
(12), (14), (15), (16), (17), or (18) of section 241(a) [8 U.S.C. §
1251(a)}; has beeu physically present in the United States for
a continuous period of not less than 10 years immediately following the commission of an act, or the assumption of a status,
constituting a ground for deportation, and proves that during
all of such period he has been and is a person of good moral
character; and is a person whose deportation would, in the
opinion of the Attorney" General result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to the alien or to his spouse, parent,
or child, who is 8. citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence.
4.Id.
5.Id.
6. 610 F.2d 651 (9th Cir. 1979) (per Tang, J.; the other panel members were Goodwin, J., and Lydick, D.J., sitting by designation).
7. 624 F.2d 85 (9th Cir. 1980) (per Pregerson, J.; the other panel members were
Nelson, J., and Wilkins, D.J., sitting by designation).
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to totally ignore the explicit continuous physical presence language of section 244(a). Upon further analysis, however, the
cases are consistent with the development of the law in this area
by the Ninth Circuit.
The Ninth Circuit and the Board of Immigration Appeals
had historically construed the language of section 244(a) strictly
and held that any absence, however brief, broke the continuity
of physical presence.8 However, in Wadman v. Immigration &
Naturalization Service,9 the Ninth Circuit borrowed a concept
developed by the Supreme Court in Rosenberg v. Fleuti 10 and
indicated that the alien's five day vacation trip to Mexico was
not a significant interruption of the continuous physical presence requirement. The court instructed that in determining
"sufficient continuity," the finding should turn on "whether the
interruption, viewed in balance with its consequences, can be
said to have been a significant one."ll
The approach of the Ninth Circuit in Wadman was adopted
by the Board of Immigration Appeals12 and led to similar decisions. In Git Foo Wong v. Immigration & Naturalization Service/ s the facts were simple for the court. The alien's departure
consisted of a two hour Sunday sightseeing trip to Mexico. The
court held that the visit "should not be regarded as meaningfully interruptive" of continuous presence in the United StateS.14
In Toon-Ming Wong v. Immigration & Naturalization Service,16
the alien had studied in Canada for six months at the age of
sixteen. However, since the alien's journey, which originally had
been planned to last only a week or two, was the result of his
8. See ArrelIano-Flores v. Hoy, 262 F.2d 667 (9th Cir. 1958); In In re S-R-, 6
I. & N. Dec. 405, 409 (B.I.A. 1954), the Board of Immigration Appeals pointed out: "[W]e
have held that physical presence means just what it says and that a P!lrson who has been
out of the United States during the period he is required to establish physical presence
cannot establish that required physical presence."
9. 329 F.2d 812 (9th Cir. 1964).
10. 374 U.S. 449 (1976). The Fleuti case involved the definition of "entry" under §
101(a)(13} of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a}(13} (1976). The Supreme Court held that in
order for a new "entry" to exist, there must be an intent to depart in a manner regarded
as meaningfully interruptive of an alien's permanent residence. 374 U.S. at 462.
11. 329 F.2d at 816.
12. See, e.g., In re Wong, 12 I. & N. Dec. 271 (B.I.A. 1967).
13. 358 F.2d 151 (9th Cir. 1966).
14. 358 F.2d at 153.
15. 363 F.2d 234 (9th Cir. 1966).
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foster parents' orders and not an exercise of his own volition, the
continuity requirement was not necessarily violated. Because of
the age of the alien and the circumstances involved, Toon-Ming
Wong cannot be generally cited for the proposition that a six
month absence will be disregarded. However it is significant that
the court stated that "length of absence is relevant, but not
alone determinative."16
.
After Mamanee v. Immigration & Naturalization Service/'1
however, it was clear that although the continuous physical presence requirement would not be "rigidly construed", length of absence was an important factor in the Ninth Circuit.18 In that
case the alien took two trips to Thailand. The first lasted five
months and was taken to help her sick mother, and the second,
with her husband and daughter, lasted nine months while her
husband recovered from an injury. On those facts, the court
found the alien ineligible for suspension because the "second departure, if not the first, was a meaningful interruption" of the
continuity requirement.19
The Ninth Circuit clarified its standards for the continuous
physical presence requirement in Kamheangpatiyooth v. Immigration & Naturalization Service 20 In that case the alien student took a one month trip to Thailand during Christmas vacation to visit his mother who was gravely ill. It was his only
absence from the United States during the twelve year period
from his initial entry until his application for suspension of deportation. In finding the alien ineligible, the immigration judge
and the Board of Immigration Appeals relied on three factors
16. [d. at 236. The language in Toon-Ming Wong is quite limiting. The court discussed the importance of the fact that the alien was a minor and stated:
On the other hand, a very brief absence might suffice [to break
the continuity requirement] if voluntary and accompanied by
a realization of possible consequences to the alien's status as a
United States resident, particularly if the journey abroad were
motivated by a purpose inconsistent with the policies of the
Act.
[d.

17. 566 F.2d 1103 (9th Cir. 1977).
18. [d. at 1105.
19. [d.

20. 597 F.2d 1253 (9th Cir. 1979). See generally Note, Suspension of Deportation: A
New Approach To The Continuous Physical Presence Requirement, 10 GOLDEN GATE
U. L. REV. 303 (1980) ..
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mentioned in Rosenberg v. Fleuti: 21 the length of visit, the purposes thereof, and whether the alien had to obtain any travel
documents. 22 The judge and the Board concluded that because
the alien traveled "several thousand miles", was away for a
month, and obtained new documents, the continuous physical
presence requirement was not met. 28 The Ninth Circuit concluded that the judge and the Board used an "erroneous legal
standard."24 Instead, the court announced the following standard for determining when an alien's departure from the United
States is meaningfully interruptive so as to break the continuous
physical presence requirement:
An absence cannot be significant or meaningfully
interruptive of the whole period if indications are
that the hardship of deportation to the alien
would be equally severe had the absence not occurred, and that no significant increase in the
likelihood of deportation could reasonably have
been expected to flow from the manner and circumstances surrounding the absence. 25

Thus, although the Fleuti factors are important, they are
not "in themselves determinative" of the continuity requirement.26 Rather, they are "only evidentiary" on the central issue"
of how the absence bears on the question of "the hardship and
unexpectedness of exposure to expulsion" in suspension cases.2'1
With that backdrop, the holdings in Chan and de Gallardo
are easier to understand. Yet because of the lengthy absences
involved, the decisions represent a major development in the
line of cases involving the continuous physical presence
requirement. 2s
21. See note 10 supra.
22. 597 F.2d at 1257.
23. The alien student in Kamheangpatiyooth obtained an immigration acceptance
form from his school (Form 1-20A), extended his Thai passport, and obtained a new
student visa abroad. ld. at 1257.
24. ld. at 1260.
25. ld. at 1257.
26.ld.
27.ld.
28. Although Toon-Ming Wong v. I.N.S., 363 F.2d 234 (9th eir. 1966), involved a six
month absence, the alien was an unemancipated youth who was following the orders of
his foster parents. See note 16 supra.
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The Chan case involved two aliens who were married. During the required period of time under section 244(a), the husband took two trips dUling school vacation. One to Hong Kong
lasted more than two an.d one-half months, and the other to Canada lasted six days. The wife made three departures-two trips
to Hong Kong (lasting ninety-five and fifty-three days, respectively) and a fifty-two day trip to Australia. On those facts, the
immigration judge and Board of Immigration Appeals concluded
that the time and distances of the trips broke the continuous
physical presence requiJ~ement. The Ninth Circuit reversed and,
in reaffirming the Kamheangpatiyooth standards, found that
"in light of the [ameliorative] Congressional purposes behind the
suspension of deportation statute," none of the absences were
meaningfully interruptive of the continuous presence requirement. 29 The Chan court was impressed by the fact that the trips
were taken during school vacations, that no new travel documents were needed, tha.t nothing was suspicious about the trips,
that the aliens traveled separately, and that they did not suspect
that their status in the United States would be altered.80
In de Gallardo, the alien traveled to Honduras for a three
and one-half month vacation during the requisite period of continuous presence. In vacating the finding of the immigration
judge and the Board of Immigration Appeals that the trip had
interrupted the continuity requirement, the Ninth Circuit reiterated the Kamheangpatiyooth standards and "held that length of
absence, along with the other Fleuti factors, are not "determinative" but are "guides" in determining "whether the alien's absence from this countrj is meaningfully interruptive" of the continuous physical presence requirement.81

The Chan and de Gallardo holdings are therefore extremely
significant because the absences involved were relatively lengthy,
and the Ninth Circuit has reaffirmed its Kamheangpatiyooth
standards in continuous physical presence cases. The court has
29. 610 F.2d at 655.
30. Id.
3!. 624 F.2d at 87. In de Gallardo, the court was also confronted with the charge
that because the alien had reentered the United States under the pretext of intending to
stay only a few days, the continuity requirement should be more rigidly construed. However, the court, citing Git Foo Wong, reaffirmed the principle that "not every violation of
law taints an otherwise innocent trip abroad." 624 F.2d at 87.
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made clear that length of absence is only one of many factors,
and that in determining "meaningful interruption" in suspension cases the main issue is how the absence bears on the question of the hardship and unexpectedness of exposure to
expulsion.32
B. Hardship Requirement

In a major en banc decision, Wang v. Immigration & Naturalization Service,33 the Ninth Circuit announced important
standards for the Board of Immigration Appeals and immigration judges to follow when presented with motions to reopen to
apply for suspension and the issue of "extreme hardship" is involved. 34 However, in a blow to the liberalizing trend of the
Ninth Circuit in suspension cases, the United States Supreme
Court reversed without full briefing or oral argument.35
The aliens, husband and wife, had previously been denied
adjustment of status under section 245 of the Act in deportation
proceedings. After the Board of Immigration Appeals dismissed
their appeal on the adjustment of status issue, the aliens moved
to reopen their deportation proceedings in order to apply for
suspension of deportation under section 244(a)(1). However, the
Board denied the motion to reopen on the grounds that the
aliens had failed to make a prima facie showing of extreme
hardship.
The claim of extreme hardship in Wang was twofold. First,
the aliens asserted that their two United States citizen children,
who could not speak Korean, would suffer "serious economic,
educational, and cultural difficulties" if forced to leave the
32. 597 F.2d at 1257; 624 F.2d at 87.
33. 622 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1980) (per Choy, J.) (en bane), rev'd, 101 S. Ct. 1027
(1981).
34. As in the requirement of continuous physical presence, the hardship requirement for suspension varies depending on the applicable ground for deportation. See note
3 supra. H a serious ground for deportation is charged, then under section 244(a)(2) of
the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(2) (1976), there must be a showing that the deportation
would result in "exceptional and extremely unusual hardship" to the alien, or to the
citizen or resident spouse, parent or child of the alien. H a less serious ground for deportation is charged, then the less rigorous requirement of "extreme hardship" is used under
§ 244(a)(1) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(1) (1976). Motions to reopen are governed by
the provisions of 8 C.F.R. § 3.2 (1980).
35. I.N.S. v. Wang, 101 S. Ct. 1027 (1981).
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United States with their parents.38 Second, the aliens argued
that deportation would "impose a severe economic hardship on
themselves."3'1 The respondents had purchased a dry cleaning
business valued at $75,000 and a home valued at $60,000. They
had approximately $44,000 in assets and liabilities of $81,000.
Apparently, none of the allegations of hardship in support of the
motion to reopen was supported by sworn statements or by
evidentiary materials, as required by 8 C.F.R. section 3.8(a)
(1980).38
The Ninth Circuit first acknowledged that an "alien cannot
gain favored status merely because he has a child who is a
United States citizen/'39 However, the court recognized that
children are within the protected class of relatives mentioned in
section 244(a)(1), and believed that the severity of hardship to
them "is difficult to discern without a hearing."4o As to the claim
of economic hardship, the Ninth Circuit also acknowledged that
economic loss alone was insufficient to find extreme hardship,
but stated:
Economic loss is not the same as economic hardship. An alien who is forced to sell property because he is bEling deported, whether he shows a
financial loss or a profit, might, nonetheless, suffer hardship. Moreover, where an alien is forced
to sell a business that has taken him years of hard
work to establish, the hardship to the alien cannot be measw~ed by any dollar amount.41

Therefore, the Ninth Circuit ruled that the Board should have
granted a hearing where "a showing of economic hardship is
combined with some other substantial hardship."42
The Supreme Court concluded that the Ninth Circuit had
Q

36. 622 F.2d at 1347-48.
37. Id. at 1348.
38. 101 S. Ct. at 1030. T.n pertinent part, 8 C.F.R. § 3.8(a)(1980) provides: "The
Board in its discretion may grant or deny oral argument. Motions to reopen shall state
the new facts to be proved at the reopened hearing and shall be supported by affidavits
or other evidentiary material"
39. 622 F.2d at 1348 (citing Choe v. I.N.S., 597 F.2d 168 (9th Cir. 1979».
40. 622 F.2d at 1348 (citing Urbano de Malaluan v. I.N.S., 577 F.2d 589 (9th Cir.
1978».
41. 622 F.2d at 1348-49.
42. [d. at 1349.
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erred in two respects. First the Supreme Court believed that the
Ninth Circuit had ignored the language of 8 C.F.R. section 3.8(a)
which sets forth the requirements of a motion to reopen.48 Specifically, the regulation requires that the motion be "supported
by affidavits or other evidentiary material." Since the allegations
of hardship in the case had been "in the main conclusory and
unsupported by affidavit," the Supreme Court concluded that
the Ninth Circuit's. grant of a new hearing "circumvented" the
cited language of the regulation. 44
The Supreme Court's second ground for reversal is more
troubling. The Court concluded that the Ninth Circuit had "encroached" on the authority to determine extreme hardship
which the Act conferred on the Attorney General and his delegates, viz., the Board of Immigration Appeals. The import of
this ground for reversal is the Supreme Court's mandate. that
virtually absolute deference must be paid to the Board's determination of what constitutes a prima facie case of extreme hardship for suspension purposes. In criticizing the Ninth Circuit's
liberal approach to the granting of a new hearing in suspension
cases, the Supreme Court stated: "The Attorney General and his
delegates have the authority to construe 'extreme hardship' narrowly should they deem it wise to do so. Such a narrow interpretation is consistent with the 'extreme hardship' language which
itself indicates the exceptional nature of the suspension remedy. "415 This decision appears, therefore, to effectively foreclose
review by the courts of appeals of decisions of the Board of Immigration Appeals denying motions to reopen to apply for suspension where the primary issue is extreme hardship. The determination as to what constitutes a prima facie case of extreme
hardship is left to the Board by the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court's opinion in Wang is a serious setback
to the Ninth Circuit's trend of fairness to aliens in suspension
cases.46 Yet, the Ninth Circuit's decisions in Wang and in a companion case, Villena v. Immigration & Naturalization Service:?
are not exactly what the Supreme Court might have character43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

101 s. Ct. at 1030. See note 38 supra.
[d.
[d. at 1031.
See text accompanying notes 5·32 supra.
622 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1980) (per Choy. J.) (en bane).

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1981

9

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 11, Iss. 1 [1981], Art. 10

294

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol.ll:294

ized them to be. Wang and Villena were remanded to the Board
on the issue of improper denial of a motion to reopen. The
Ninth Circuit in Wang had reminded practitioners that:
Although an alien who sets forth a prima facie
case of eligibility for relief must be afforded a
hearing, the mere fact that a prima facie case is
made does not lpreordain the result of the hearing.
Proof of eligibility does not compel that relief be
granted . . . but only triggers the exercise of the
Attorney General's discretion to determine
whether the alien merits the relief.48

Thus it could be argued that all the Ninth Circuit was doing in
Wang was to insure that the alien had a fair hearing on the suspension application, not to substitute its opinion of what constituted extreme hardship at the hearing itself. Viewed in that
light, the Supreme Court decision in Wang represents an overreaction to a mere due process/fair hearing concept rather than
substantive grants of suspension of deportation.
For practitioners, the end to this chapter in the suspension
of deportation area will be written by the Board of Immigration
Appeals which has, with the Supreme Court's opinion in Wang,
received the blessing of the nation's highest court to act almost
at will in determining when to grant an alien's motion to reopen
to apply for suspensioll of deportation when the primary issue is
extreme hardship.
II. ADJUSTMENT OF STATUS-MOTION TO REOPEN
In a troubling en banc decision, Obitz v. Immigration &
Naturalization Service,49 the Ninth Circuit affirmed a Board of
Immigration Appeals denial of an alien's motion to reopen to
apply for adjustment of status to that of a permanent resident.
This was done in spite of the fact that the alien had recently
married a United States citizen, the alien was the beneficiary of
an approved visa petition filed by her husband, and the government did not dispute the alien's statutory eligibility for adjustment of status. 50 The result is surprising in light of the
Ninth Circuit's recent holdings favoring the grant of motions to
48. Id. at 1347.
49. 623 F.2d 1331 (9th
50. Id. at 1332.
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reopen in the much more discretionary area of suspension of
deportation. lSI
The facts in Obitz are important in order to understand the
context of the motion to reopen in question. On February 26,
1977 while under an order to depart the United States by March
18, 1977, the alien married a United States citizen.1S2 After her
husband filed an immediate relativelS3 petition for her, the alien
moved to reopen her deportation hearing in order to request extended voluntary departure while the petition was pending. This
request was denied by the Board and the Ninth Circuit affirmed
in an unpublished decision.1S" The immediate relative visa petition was approved on December 10, 1977, so the alien filed a new
motion to reopen to apply for adjustment of status. ISIS The Board
denied the new request to reopen as well,ISS and the Ninth Circuit followed suit. IS?
The court distinguished the suspension motion to reopen
situations of Wang v. Immigration & Naturalization Service lSs
and Urbano de Malaluan v. Immigration & Naturalization Service lS9 from the adjustment motion to reopen with questionable
51. See discussion of Wang in text accompanying notes 33-48 supra.
52. 623 F.2d at 1332.
53. The immediate relative category is provided for in § 201(b) of the Act, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1151(b) (1976), which provides:
The immediate relatives referred to in subsection (a) of
this section shall mean the children, spouses, and parents of a
citi2en of the United States: Provided, That in the case of parents, such citi2en must be at least twenty-one years of age.
The immediate relatives specified in this subsection who are
otherwise qualified for admission as immigrants shall be admitted as such, without regard to the numerical limitations in
this Chapter.
54. 623 F.2d at 1332. This initial motion to reopen to apply for extended voluntary
departure from the Board appears to be in itself inappropriate. Authority to extend voluntary departure time specified initially by an immigration judge or the Board is "within
the sole jurisdiction of the district director." 8 C.F.R. § 244.2 (1980).
55. The alien was not eligible to apply for adjustment of status until the visa petition was approved. 8 C.F.R. § 245.1(d) (1980). Also, because deportation proceedings had
commenced, it can be presumed that an order to show cause had been issued. 8 C.F.R. §
242.1(a) (1980). Therefore, the request for adjustment of status could not be made to the
district director who lost jurisdiction over adjustment as soon as the order to show cause
was served. 8 C.F.R. § 245.2(a) (1980).
56. 623 F.2d at 1332.
57. ld. at 1333.
58. See note 33 supra and accompanying text.
59. 577 F.2d 589 (9th Cir. 1978).
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rationale. Basically, the court re,asoned that statutory eligibility
for suspension of deportation was a discretionary determination,
due to the extreme hardship requirement which was difficult to
make without a hearing.6o However, statutory eligibility for "adjustment of status does not involve a discretionary determination. Eligibility turns on compliance with fixed statutory standards/'sl Thus, the court believed that unlike the suspension
cases, a determination of statutory eligibility for adjustment of
status did not require a hearing.62 Rather, the inquiry should be
whether the alien seeking adjustment of status had presented
new evidence "that hears on whether the Attorney General
should exercise his discretion to adjust her status now that her
statutory eligibility has been established."ss The court believed
that the alien had not done so because her statutory eligibility
had been established by the "essentially ministerial act of the
Service" approving the visa petition, and the facts were substantially as they were when the first motion to reopen had been
made for voluntary departure.M
The dissent in Obitz S5 pointed out several flaws in the majority's analysis. First, the eligibility determination for adjustment of status is not "essentially ministerial" given the thirtythree grounds for exclusion found in section 212(a)66 of the Act
which must be satisfi.ed.67 Second, the holding in Urbano de
Malaluan ordered a hearing reopened not for the sole purpose of
determining eligibility, but also to determine whether discretion
should be granted.6s The dissent pointed out: "The majority approach therefore penalizes an alien for making too strong a
showing of eligibility. In addition, under the majority view, there
is nothing to prevent the Service from defeating the alien's right
to a hearing through the simple expedient of stipulating to eligibility."69 Additionally, the approval of the visa petition was an
60. 623 F.2d at 1333.
61. Id. at 1332.
62. Id. at 1333.
63.Id.
64.Id.
65. Id. at 1333-37 (per Tang, J.).
66. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
67. 623 F.2d at 1335.
68. Id. at 1336.
69. Id. The majority's position is particularly bothersome because it literally condones the government's refusal to exercise discretion once statutory eligibility has been

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol11/iss1/10

12

Hing: Immigration Law

1981]

IMMIGRATION LAW

297

important new fact because it indicated the government's satisfaction that the marriage was bona fide. '10 Furthermore, the dissent strongly argued that as a matter of policy, it is judicially
wise to treat motions to reopen uniformly for analogous remedial
statutes.
The Obitz decision comes as a surprise to the immigration
practitioner who correctly views adjustment of status under section 245 as a much more straight-forward relief than suspension
of deportation under section 244. In practice, relief under section 245 is generally granted without much question once eligibility is established, and this fact serves as the basis for the unsettling feeling derived from the result in Obitz.
The effect of Obitz is, however, quite limited given the
Board's decision in In re Matter of Garcia,'1l of which the Ninth
Circuit was apparently unaware. Garcia was decided by the
Board of Immigration Appeals subsequent to the second motion
to reopen in Obitz and involved similar facts. The alien in Garcia was under an order to depart voluntarily when he married a
United States citizen. In accordance with a new regulation,'12 the
alien simultaneously submitted the visa petition and adjustment
of status application and moved to reopen for relief under section 245.'13 In one large sense, therefore, the alien in Obitz, whose
visa petition had been approved, was in a much better position
than the alien in Garcia. Yet in Garcia, the Board held as a matter of policy that a motion to reopen should be granted to such a
person "unless clear ineligibility is apparent in the record. "'14 It
would appear, therefore, that persons such as the alien in Obitz
established. The failure to exercise discretion has traditionally been grounds for reversing the Board. See Asimakopoulos v. I.N.S., 445 F.2d 1362 (9th Cir. 1971).
70. 623 F.2d at 1336.
71. Interim Decision 2684 (B.I.A. Dec. 27, 1978).
72. 8 C.F.R. § 245.2(a)(2) (1980) provides in pertinent part:
If a visa petition is submitted simultaneously with the adjustment application, the adjustment application shall be retained for processing only if approval of the petition when
reached for adjudication would make a visa immediately available at the time of filing of the adjustment application. If such
petition is subsequently approved, the date of tiling the adjustment application shall be deemed the date on which the
accompanying petition was tiled.
73. Interim Decision 2684, at 2.
74. Id. at 3.
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would certainly fall within the policy of Garcia, and the Board
will grant a motion to reopen, particularly where the government
concedes eligibility.

III. VIABILITY REQUIREMENT FOR MARRIAGES
Under section 201(b) of the Act,'1!> the alien spouse of a
United States citizen is classified as an immediate relative for
immigration purposes. However, it has long been established
that if a marriage is a sham or fraudulent from its inception, the
marriage shall not bestow immigration benefits on the alien.'16
The more difficult policy question arises when the marriage was
not a sham or fraudulent from its inception, but the marriage
has become nonviability or "factually dead," although not legally terminated.
The Ninth Circuit addressed this question in a limited form
last term in Dabaghian v. Civiletti.'1'1 Mter marrying a United
States citizen, the alieJO. student in Dabaghian applied for and
was granted adjustment of status to that of a lawful permanent
resident in 1972.'18 However, in 1974 the I.N.S. moved under section 246 of the Act'1S to rescind the adjustment of status on the
ground that the alien had not been eligible for it in 1972.80 The
75. See note 53 supra.
76. See Bark v. I.N.S., 511 F.2d 1200 (9th Cir. 1975); Garcia-Jaramillo v. I.N.S., 604
F.2d 1236 (9th Cir. 1979). Under § 241(c) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1251(c) (1976), an ali~n
who has obtained immigrant status on the basis of of a sham marriage is deportable.
Furthermore, under § 204(c) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1154(c) (1980), an alien who
previously entered on the basin of a sham marriage is forever precluded from being the
beneficiary of another petition.
77. 607 F.2d 868 (9th Cir. 1979) (per Choy, J.; the other panel members were Anderson, J., and Hug, J.).
78. ld. at 869.
79. Section 246 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1256 (1976), provides in relevant part:
If, at any time within five years after the status of a person
has been otherwise adjusted under the provisions of section
1255 or 1259 of this title [§ 245 or 249 of the Act] or any other
provision of law to that of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, it shall appear to the satisfaction of the Attorney General that the person was not in fact eligible for such
adjustment of status, the Attorney General shall rescind the
action taken gr8Ilting an adjustment of status to such person
and compelling deportation in the case of such person if that
occurred and the person shall thereupon be subject to all provisions of this Act to the S8IDe extent as if the adjustment of
status had not been made.
SO. 607 F.2d at 869.
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basis of the government's argument was that at the time of adjustment of status, the couple was separated and the marriage
was "dead in fact," even though still legally alive. 81 However, the
government never claimed or proved that the marriage was a
sham or fraud.
In rejecting the government's position, the court pointed out
that there was no statutory or federal case law to support the
nonviability or "dead in fact," theory and stated, "If a marriage
is not sham or fraudulent from its inception, it is valid for the
purposes of determining eligibility for adjustment of status
under § 245 of the Act until it is legally dissolved. "82 Furthermore, the alien's purported ineligibility depended on whether he
was the "spouse of a United States citizen at the time of adjustment," and because the word "spouSes" in section 201(b) "includes the parties to all marriages that are ... not sham," the
alien was not ineligible under section 245 of the Act. 83 The court
thereby reversed the Board and ordered that the' alien be
reinstated. 8~
The Dabaghian decision does not necessarily sound the
death knell of the application of the viability requirement in im~
migration cases. The Dabaghian panel had to wrestle with an
earlier Ninth Circuit decision, Menezes v. Immigration & Naturalization Service,8G which contained troublesome language supporting the application of the viability requirement. Menezes involved a marriage and an actual section 245 adjustment of status
application. At the deportation hearing, the immigration judge
found the alien statutorily eligible, but denied the application as
a matter of discretion because the couple had been separated for
some time. 88 By the time Menezes reached the Board of Immigration Appeals, the alien and his United States citizen spouse
were divorced, thus he was ineligible for adjustment of status
81. ld.
82. ld. 8 C.F.R. § 245.1(d) (1980) provides that an applicant is not eligible for a
§ 245 adjustment unless a visa petition has been filed and approved. However, under 8
C.F.R. § 205.1(a)(4) (1980), the approval of a visa petition is automatically revoked when
the relationship of husband and wife is legally terminated.
83. 607 F.2d at 871.
84.ld.
85. 601 F.2d 1028 (9th Cir. 1979).
86. ld. at 1029-30.
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because the -approved ,.lisa petition was automatically revoked.87
However, rather than affirming the Board's decision on that
point, the Menezes panel went on to affirm the immigration
judge's discretionary authority to deny adjustment under section
245 if the marriage is no longer vial?le:
Congress provided that, to be admitted for
permanent residence, immediate relatives must
submit to the discretion of the Attorney General
by applying for adjustment of status under § 245.
In determinillg whether to grant permanent
resident statUB based on a marriage, it is highly
relevant that the relationship may no longer be in
existence wben the application is under
consideration.88

The Dabaghian panel first labeled as dictum the Menezes
panel's approval of the immigration judge's discretionary denial
of adjustment on the ·basis of the non-sham, but nonviable marriage.89 But the Dabaghian panel went out of its way to point
out that this dictum did not conflict with its own holding because the "INS discretion that the Menezes lnimigration Judge
relied on comes into play only after eligibility under § 245 has
been established; Menezes did not deny that any legally valid,
non-sham marriage suffices for § 245 eligibility."90
Thus, the Dabaghian panel viewed its decision as a statutory eligibility case. In other words, the party to a non-sham but
nonviable marriage llIlay meet the statutory eligibility requirements for adjustment of status under section 245, ·but the Attorney General may "in his discretion" still deny adjustment if the
marriage is "factually dead." Therefore, even after Dabaghian,
the government may still deny section 245 adjustment in a marriage case where the relationship is not viable.91
87. See note 82 supra.
88. 601 F.2d at 1035.
89. 607 F.2d at 871.
9O.Id.
91. Recently in In re McKee, Interim Decision 2782 (B.I.A. 1980), the Board of Immigration Appeals struck down viabilitycif marriage as a requirement for approval of a
visa petition and adopted the reaSoning in Chan v. Bell, 464 F. Supp. 125 (D.D.C. 1978).
However, the Board has not squarely faced the issue of whether, once the visa petition
has been approved and the immigration judge adjudicates an adjustment application, the
immigration judge may in. his or her discretion deny the § 245 adjustment application on
nonviability grounds. It seems incongruous that the Board would permit such a result,
but the language in Dabaghian certainly would sustain such a result.
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IV. VIOLATION OF REGULATIONS
The Ninth Circuit decided several cases in the past term
raising the issue of what effect the government's violation of its
own regulations has on deportation proceedings. United States
v. Vega-Mejia,92 United States v. Rangel-Gonzales,98 and
United States v. Lagarda-AguilarM were criminal cases in which
the defendants were being charged with illegally reentering the
United States after having been previously deported, a violation
of section 276 of the Act. 911 Tejeda-Mata v. Immigration & Naturalization Service 96 was a deportation case.
In Vega-Mejia and Rangel-Gonzales the defendants argued
that the~ underlying deportations were unlawful because the
I.N.S. had failed to advise them of the right to confer with Mexican consular officials prior to hearing as required by 8 C.F.R.
section 242.2(e).9'1 Both defendants relied heavily on United
States v. Calderon-Median98 for their collateral attacks on de92. 611 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1979) (per curiam; the members of the panel were
Duniway, J., Choy, J., and Peck, D.J., sitting by designation).
93. 617 F.2d 529 (9th Cir. 1980) (per Schroeder, J., the other members of the panel
were Merrill, J., and Tang, J.).
94. 617 F.2d 527 (9th Cir. 1980) (per Schroeder, J.; the other members of the panel
were Merrill, J., and Tang, J.).
95. Section 276 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (1976), provides:
Any alien who(1) has been arrested and deported or excluded and deported,
and thereafter
(2) enters, attempts to enter, or is at any time found in, the
United States, unless (A) prior to his reembarkation at a place
outside the United States of his application for admission
from foreign contiguous territory, the Attorney General has
expressly consented to such alien's reapplying for admission;
or (B) with respect to an alien previously excluded and deported, unless such alien shall establish that he was not required to obtain such advance consent under this or any prior
Act, shall be guilty of a felony, and upon conviction thereof,
be punished by imprisonment of not more than two years, or
by a fine of not more than $1,000, or both.
96. 626 F.2d 721 (9th Cir. 1980) (per Bartels, D.J., sitting by designation; the other
panel members were Choy, J., and Ferguson, J.).
97. 8 C.F.R. § 242.2(e) (1980), in relevant part provides: "Every detained alien shall
be notified that he may communicate with the consular of diplomatic officers of the
country of his nationality in the United States."
98. 691 F.2d 529 (9th Cir. 1979). Rangel-Gonzales was actually first before the
Ninth Circuit as a companion to Calderon-Medina. However, the case was remanded to
allow the defendant the opportunity to demonstrate prejudice resulting from the I.N.S.
regulation violation. ld. at 532.
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portation based on violations of I.N.S. regulations. In CalderonMedina, the Ninth Circuit adopted a two-step test to determine
whether violation of a given regulation invalidates the deportation. 99 First the regulation itself must serve a purpose of benefit
to the alien, and second, the I.N.S. violation must have
prejudiced interests of' the alien which were protected by the
regulation.
Using the Calderon-Medina test, the court in RangelGonzales first found that 8 C.F.R. section 242.2{e) serves a purpose of benefit to the Bllien.100 "It was intended to insure compliance with this country's treaty obligations to promote assistance
from their country of origin for aliens facing deportation proceedings in the United States. mol As to the issue of predjudice,
the court analyzed the evidence presented by both parties and
concluded that the defendant satisfied his burden of establishing
that he did not know about his right to consult with consular
officials, that he would have availed himself of the right had he
known of it, and that he would have obtained assistance in
resisting deportation.lo2 The court therefore dismissed the
indictment. lOS
The defendant in Vega-Mejia was not as successful. The
court affirmed the district court finding that the defendant was
not prejudiced by the regulation violation in that the defendant
would not have spoken to the Mexican consul. lo, Additionally,
99. [d. at 531.

100. 617 F.2d at 530.
101. [d.
102. [d. at 531. The evidence submitted by the defendant indicated that he would
have probably obtained voluntary departure under § 244(e) rather than deportation. Section 244(e) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1254(e) (1976) provides:
The Attorney General may, in his discretion, permit any alien
under deportation proceedings, other than an alien within th~
provisions of paragraph (4), (5), (6), (7), (11), (12), (14), (15),
(16), (17), or (18), of section 1251 of this title [§ 241(0) of the
Act] (and also any alien within the purview of such
paragraphs if he is also within the provisions of paragraph (2)
of subsection (11) of this section), to depart voluntarily from
the United States at his own expense in lieu of deportation if
such alien shall establish to the satisfaction of the Attorney
General that he is, and has been, a person of good moral character for at least five years immediately preceding his application for voluntary departure under this subsection.
103. 617 F.2d at 533.
104. 611 F.2d at 752.
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the record reflected that the defendant's main concern was to
"avoid detention and delay" his return to Mexico. loll
The defendant in United States v. Lagarda-Aguilar admitted that he had previously been deported in 1977.106 However,
he returned in 1978 under the discretionary parole status
authority of the Attorney General of section 212(d)(5) of the
Act. 10? When the government sought to terminate the defendant's parole status, agents merely escorted him to the Mexican
border without formal written notice as required by 8 C.F.R.
section 212.5(b).108 The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the indictment without even having to refer to the
Calderon-Medina test since the requirement of written notice is
the "only safeguard, for both the alien and the United States
government, that parole status is administered in an orderly
manner. "109
The alien in Tejeda-Mata v. Immigration & Naturalization
Service was facing deportation rather than criminal charges.
105.ld.
106. 617 F.2d at 527.
107. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5) (1976), provides:
The Attorney General may [except as provided in subparagraph (b)J, in his discretion parole into the United States
temporarily under such conditions as he may prescribe for
emergent reasons or for reasons deemed strictly in the public
interest any alien applying for admission to the United States,
but such parole of such alien shall not be regarded as an admission of the alien and when the purposes of such parole
shall, in the opinion of the Attorney General, have been served
the alien shall forthwith return or be returned to the custody
from which he was paroled and thereafter his case shall continue to be dealt with in the same manner as that of any other
applicant for admission to the United States.
108. 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(b) (1980) provides:
Termination of parole. At the expiration of the period of
time or upon accomplishment of the purpose for which parole
was authorized or when the opinion of the district director in
charge of the area in which the alien is located that neither
emergency nor public interest warrants the continued presence of the alien in the United States, parole shall be terminated upon written notice to the alien and he shall be restored
to the status which he had at the time of parole, and further
inspection or hearing shall be conducted under section 235 or
236 of the Act [8 U.S.C. §§ 1225, 1226] and this chapter, or
any order of exclusion and deportation previously entered
shall be executed.
109. 617 F.2d at 528.
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However on appeal he argued that the failure of the I.N.S. to
advise him of his right to contact the Mexican consul violated 8
C.F.R. section 242.2{e) citing Calderon-Medinapo The argument was somewhat novel because in Rangel-Gonzales, VegaMejia, and Lagarda-Aguilar, the defendants were not contesting
deportability, but rather were challenging their criminal indictments. However, in Tejeda-Mata, the alien appears to have
been raising the violation of regulation question as a defense to
deportability itself. The court actually did not meet this question squarely because the alien had failed to r&ise the issue below and was deemed not to have exhausted administrative remedies.ll1 If the court had gone on to the Calderon-Medina test in
this particular case, it is doubtful that the alien would have benefited by its application because of the regulation involved.
Where an alien is clearly deportable, as was the case in TejedaMata, the only real benefit that such an alien might derive from
exercising the right to contact the foreign consul is that the consul could assist in obtaining voluntary departure in lieu of deportation.1l2 Such was the case in Rangel-Gonzales. However, in
Tejeda-Mata, the alien had already been granted the privilege
of voluntary departure by the immigration judgepa Thus, it
would have been difficult for the alien to make a showing of
prejudice as required. by Calderon-Medina. 1H
However, the importance of Tejeda-Mata lies in the court's
apparent willingness to entertain a timely raised violation of regulation argument in the deportation setting itself. As long as the
two-step test of Calderon-Medina is met, it appears that the
Ninth Circuit will be prepared to fashion relief which will alleviate the demonstrated prejudice to the alien.u 5
110. 626 F.2d at 725.
111. [d. at 726.
112. See note 102 infra.
113. 626 F.2d at 723.
114. Prejudice could be shown if there were defenses or relief other than voluntary
departure which were available to the alien, which the consul would have assisted on.
However, the record in Tejeda-Mata did not suggest the possibility of any other relief.
115. In Sun n Y00 v. I.N.S. 534 F.2d 1325 (9th Cir. 1976), the court used a violation
of regulation theory in a deportation setting to support the major contention that there
had been "affirmative misconduct" on the part of I.N.S. who should thereby be estopped.
And in Mendez v. I.N.S., 563 F.2d 956 (9th Cir. 1977), the court ordered that an alien be
readmitted after being deported in violation of a regulation. See also, Cornell-Rodriguez
v. I.N.S., 532 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1976).
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